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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 17-3618 
________________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ROMEL WILSON,  
 
           Appellant 
________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2-15-cr-00257-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose  
________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on July 9, 2019  
 
Before: MCKEE, ROTH and RENDELL, Circuit Judges  
 
(Opinion filed February 3, 2020) 
________________ 
 
OPINION 
________________ 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
 
                                              
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Romel Wilson appeals the sentence imposed by the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
I 
In April 2015, Wilson was arrested after selling crack cocaine and a mixture of 
heroin and fentanyl to an undercover Pittsburgh police officer, posing as a drug user.  A 
search of Wilson’s vehicle uncovered two more bags of crack cocaine and $636 in 
addition to the buy money.  Wilson was originally charged in state court.  In connection 
with the same conduct, he was later indicted in federal court for possession with intent to 
distribute heroin, fentanyl, and crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 
841(b)(1)(C).  In December 2015, following his federal indictment and the issuance of a 
federal arrest warrant, law enforcement officials decided to serve Wilson’s arrest warrant 
during another undercover buy.  Wilson was arrested upon arriving at the location of the 
undercover buy.1   
Wilson pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute heroin, fentanyl, and 
cocaine base.  At the time he pled guilty, Wilson had four prior drug distribution 
convictions for possession with intent to deliver heroin and cocaine under 35 Pa. Stat. 
Ann. § 780-113(a)(30).  As a result, the Presentence Report (PSR) characterized him as a 
“career offender” within the meaning of United States Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.1.  
Based on his total offense level of 31 and his criminal history category of VI, the 
Guidelines range was calculated as 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment.   
                                              
1 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania nolle prossed all state charges against Wilson once 
the federal case was initiated.   
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Wilson expressed two main objections to the PSR:  the factual descriptions of his 
prior convictions and his career-offender classification.  Claiming the Guidelines range 
was “patently unreasonable,” Wilson moved for a downward departure for the alleged 
overstatement of his criminal history, arguing that his previous convictions were both 
non-violent and low-level.  He also requested a downward variance, asking for a 96-
month sentence while the government sought a sentence within the Guidelines range of 
188 to 235 months. 
A sentencing hearing was held in November 2017.  The District Court overruled 
Wilson’s objections to the factual summaries in the PSR criminal history section and his 
career-offender designation.  The court, however, did grant his requests for a downward 
departure, reducing his criminal history category from VI to V, and a downward variance 
in his offense level from 31 to 27, based on overstatement of his criminal history.  His 
resulting Guidelines range was 120 to 150 months.  After considering the sentencing 
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the District Court imposed a sentence of 120 
months, at the bottom of the range.  
In imposing the sentence, the District Court discussed Wilson’s history and 
characteristics, describing him as a “mixed bag” of bad and good.2  The court also 
emphasized deterrence, noting that “it does seem that there isn’t much that deters you 
from selling . . ..  No amount of supervision, no threat of prosecution hanging over your 
head.”3 
                                              
2 App. 223-24.  
3 App. 225.  
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At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, Wilson’s counsel objected generally 
to the sentence as being “substantively or procedurally unreasonable.”4  Wilson appealed. 
II5 
The parties disagree about the appropriate standard of appellate review.  While 
Wilson contends that de novo review applies to his due process argument, the 
government maintains he never preserved the issue and thus faces plain error review.  
The government is correct.  Our case law makes clear that an objection must be 
sufficiently specific to serve notice as to the underlying basis for the objection.6  Defense 
counsel’s objection was fatally vague.  Where, as here, an objection is not preserved at 
sentencing, we review only for plain error.7  Under this standard, Wilson bears the burden 
of showing that an error (1) was made, (2) is clear or obvious, and (3) affects his 
substantial rights.8  Even if all three conditions are met, we exercise our discretion to 
correct the error only if it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings.”9 
                                              
4 App. 231.  
5 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
6 United States v. Russell, 134 F.3d 171, 179 (3d Cir. 1998).  
7 Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) provides that, in the absence of proper preservation, plain error 
review applies.  The Supreme Court has held that appellate courts can review 
unpreserved objections for plain error only.  United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-
33 (1993).  
8 United States v. Miller, 833 F.3d 274, 283 (3d Cir. 2016); see also Olano, 507 U.S. at 
734 (“‘Plain’ is synonymous with ‘clear’ or, equivalently, ‘obvious.’”).  
9 United States v. Mateo-Medina, 845 F.3d 546, 550 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing United States 
v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 539 (3d Cir. 2008)).  
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On the other hand, Wilson preserved his challenge to his career-offender 
designation.  We exercise plenary review over objections to career-offender 
enhancements.10 
III 
A 
 Under the Due Process Clause, a defendant cannot be deprived of liberty based 
upon mere speculation.11  We have applied this principle in numerous cases, including 
United States v. Berry,12 upon which Wilson relies to argue that the court erred by 
speculating that incarceration deters drug trafficking and that his incapacitation would 
protect the community.  In Berry, we found plain error where the sentencing court 
explicitly relied on unsupported speculation drawn from the defendants’ bare arrest 
records.13 
Wilson argues that, just as the court in Berry improperly relied on unfounded 
speculation, here too, the District Court erred by relying on an inaccurate understanding 
of Wilson’s apparent failure to be deterred from drug trafficking.  The government 
counters by pointing out that the District Court relied on information concerning Wilson 
as an individual, not on general statistics regarding drug traffickers.  The government also 
                                              
10 See United States v. Glass, 904 F.3d 319, 321 (3d Cir. 2018).   
11 United States v. Ferguson, 876 F. 3d 512, 515 (3d Cir. 2017). 
12 553 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2009).  
13 Id. at 281.  
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cited United States v. Ferguson,14 where we clarified the difference between improper 
reliance on information and acceptable reference to it.15 
To show plain error, Wilson must be able to “bridge the gap between reference 
and reliance.”16  He is unable to do so.  Although the District Court referred to 
deterrence, its sentencing decision was based on Wilson’s personal history of recidivism, 
not on general information from empirical studies.  Moreover, earlier in the hearing, 
when the government speculated about the amount of heroin Wilson may have previously 
distributed, the District Court pushed back:  “I can really only base my decision on what 
he’s here for and his criminal history.”17   
 Wilson has failed to demonstrate that the District Court relied on speculative 
information in violation of his due process rights.  
B 
Wilson also challenges his sentence on the ground that the District Court 
improperly designated him a “career offender” under Section 4B1.1 of the Guidelines 
based on his prior controlled substance convictions.  Our recent decision in United States 
v. Daniels18 forecloses this argument. 
Wilson’s status as a career offender is dictated by his criminal record, which 
includes four prior felony drug-trafficking convictions in Pennsylvania in violation of § 
                                              
14 876 F.3d 512 (3d Cir. 2017).  
15 Id. at 516. 
16 Id. at 517.   
17 App. 209. 
18 915 F.3d 148 (3d Cir. 2019).   
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780-113(a)(30).19  Wilson contends that those convictions do not qualify as career-
offender predicates because a violation of § 780-113(a)(30) is broader than the generic 
definition of “controlled substance offense” under the Guidelines.  Wilson’s argument 
fails.   
In United States v. Daniels, we addressed whether a conviction under § 780-
113(a)(30) constituted a predicate “serious drug offense” for purposes of the Armed 
Career Criminal Act (ACCA).20  We held that it did—that the ACCA’s definition of a 
“serious drug offense” encompasses attempts to manufacture, distribute, or possess with 
intent to manufacture or distribute a controlled substance—and affirmed the district 
court’s sentence.21  The same result applies here. 
Wilson contends Commonwealth v. Donahue, a Pennsylvania Superior Court case, 
supports his argument that § 780-113(a)(30) criminalizes a “mere offer to sell drugs,” and 
accordingly, that a Pennsylvania conviction for delivery of a controlled substance is 
broader than the Guidelines’ definition of a “controlled substance offense.”  But this 
Court in Daniels rejected that very argument.22  In light of Daniels, we hold that the 
District Court correctly designated Wilson a “career offender” under the Guidelines. 
IV 
 For the above reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
                                              
19 The statute outlaws “the manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to 
manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance . . . or knowingly creating, delivering, or 
possessing with intent to deliver, a counterfeit controlled substance.”    
20 915 F.3d at 149.   
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 164-65.  
